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RIGHTS IN CONFLICT:
THE DILEMMA OF CHARTER LEGITIMACY
ANDREW PETTERt and ALLAN C. HUTCHINSONtt

"All colours will agree in the dark"
FRANCIS BACON

I. INTRODUCTION
For an aristocrat, Lord Acton has had a profound influence on the
development of popular democratic theory and practice. His famous
aphorism that "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts
absolutely" is regarded today as common wisdom. Some might even
regard it as the first principle of democratic government, that is, a
society must be' organized so that the corrupting influence of power
is reduced to an operative minimum.
Despite its popular appeal, this Actonion axiom is too limited in
scope and too negative in character to warrant exclusive loyalty.
In any organized society, the exercise of power is constant and inevitable. Power does not so much lead to corruption as provide the
framework within which corruption, or enlightenment, is achieved.'
Nevertheless, Lord Acton's principle underscores the need to guard
against the accumulation of power and emphasizes the attraction of
democracy as a device for ensuring that power is widely shared. In
short, he has provided an important, if rudimentary, benchmark
against which to measure the organization of bureaucratic power
and governmental authority.
f Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria.
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We would like to thank Jamie Cassels for his helpful comments and suggestions
on an earlier draft of this paper.
1 See A. Hutchinson, Dwelling on the Threshold: Critical Essays on Modern
Legal Thought (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) at 261-93.
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In the contemporary Canadian state, democracy is the primary
mechanism used to justify the power and legitimacy of government.
Although government exercises vast power, its authority is warranted
by the fact that those with ultimate responsibility for governmental
action are elected officials. While these representatives may not
exactly qualify as the public's alter ego, they are considered to owe a
responsibility to Canadian electors and are accountable to them.
Whatever the shortcomings of the actual practice,2 the moral authority and political legitimacy of government rests largely on a
principle of democratic representation.
For this reason, the enactment in 1982 of the CanadianCharter
of Rights and Freedoms created something of a dilemma for the
theoretical apologists of Canadian politics and democracy. Their
task was to demonstrate that, although its function was to withdraw
large areas of social regulation from the legislative reach of elected
bodies, the Charter remained faithful to the ideals of democratic
government. This apprehended crisis in legitimacy was heightened by
the fact that the Charterwas to be interpreted and enforced by the
judiciary, a small and unrepresentative group of appointed officials.
Thus the challenge for supporters of the Charterwas to explain the
seeming paradox that democracy was best promoted by a reduction
in popular sovereignty and the transfer of power to a small coterie
of unelected bureaucrats. In Actonian terms, why is it that, while
power tends to corrupt, the absolute exercise of judicial power not
only fails to corrupt, but actually guards against the corrupt exercise
of legislative power?
In this short essay, we intend to show that the traditional defence
of Charteradjudication in the name of democracy is more of a contradiction than a paradox. We will comment upon the primary
justification offered by the commentators and courts to defend the
legitimacy of Charteradjudication. The only real difference between
scholarly and judicial writings is that the former are more explicit
and less superficial than the latter. Although there are many subtle
shadings, the unifying theme of the academic literature is the reliance
upon a combination of liberal rights theory and conservative resort
to conventional morality. By reference to the growing body of court
decisions, our intention is to demonstrate that this theoretical amalgam fails to provide a satisfactory account of Charter legitimacy.
2

For a critique, see A. Hutchinson and P. Monahan, "Democracy and the

Rule

of Law" in A. Hutchinson and P. Monahan, eds., The Rule of Law: Ideal or
Ideology (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 97-123.
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II. THE DEFENCE OF CHARTER LEGITIMACY
In most writings on the Charter,the structural framework within
which judicial decisions are made is too often taken for granted. The
Charterof Rights and Freedoms is regarded as "fundamental law"
because it is entrenched within the nation's Constitution. Thus it is
more difficult to amend than regularly enacted laws; moreover, it
takes priority over those laws. As a broad-ranging document, it sets
out certain general rights, such as equality, liberty and freedom of
association, which it guarantees to all citizens. However, while these
rights are fundamental, they are not absolute. They almost always
are subject to limitations, either implied within the right or imposed
upon it by means of the "reasonable limits" proviso in s. I. The task
of interpreting these rights and their limits rests ultimately with the
courts. Yet judges do not have a roving commission. The agenda is
set on a case-by-case basis in response to claims brought before the
courts, for the most part, by private litigants at their own expense.
The Charterraises special concerns about the interpretive method
of judges and the legitimacy of their role. These concerns are made
more pressing by the open-ended nature of Charter rights and the
invitation to the courts to place "reasonable limits" upon those rights.
Thus the problem is not about who should interpret, but rather about
how judges should interpret the Charter.
A variety of answers are offered. The most general and common is
that judicial decision-making retains an essential degree of functional
autonomy. Legal interpretation can and should be performed in a
way that distinguishes it from ideological debate. The role of traditional jurists has been to give theoretical substance to these ideas and
intuitions. Although this endeavour has assumed a higher profile
since the advent of the Charter,the task of legitimizing judicial interpretation has been the abiding preoccupation of common law jurisprudence. In the first half of this century, the dispute was over the
possibility of establishing a mode of judicial activity that was completely separate from politics. However, in the past couple of decades,
the jurisprudential focus has shifted subtly but substantially.3 The
contemporary view is to fashion an interpretive theory that recognizes that judicial decision-making does not operate independently
'

See A. Hutchinson and P. Monahan, "The Unfolding Drama of American
Legal Thought: Law, Politics and Critical Legal Scholars" (1984) 34 Stan
L.R. x99 at 2o2-8; and, M. Tushnet, Red, White and Blue: A Critical
Analysis of ConstitutionalLaw (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).
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of politics, but neither does it reduce entirely to politics. Acknowledging the intimate relation between law and politics, theorists search
for an explanation that both unifies and distinguishes legal and
political method. Nonetheless, the ultimate goal of the enterprise
remains the same: to establish a meaningful division between law
and politics. Formalism, that is, the belief in a mode of legal justification distinct from open ideological debate that represents a workable
scheme of social justice, continues to cast its long shadow over the
modem terrain.
While there are as many jurisprudential theories as there are
theorists, two general themes emerge from the literature defending
the legitimacy of constitutionally entrenched rights. One line of
argument suggests that such rights reflect some transcendent set of
norms or values, rooted in Nature, God or some lesser philosophical
deity. According to this naturalist vision, the role of the courts is
simply to identify and give interpretive effect to these higher norms
and values. Another school of thought proceeds from the assumption
that such rights reflect the shared values and aspirations of the community from which they arise. According to this positivist perspective,
the role of the courts is confined to locating these values and applying
them to litigated cases.
Within the Canadian genre of rights jurisprudence, the positivist
and naturalist tendencies do not run in competing lines, but weave
together in an effort to avoid the shortcomings of each. With characteristic genius for pragmatic compromise, Canadian theorists have
recognized that invoking a vision of natural rights - be it John
Stuart Mill's, Brian Mulroney's or Ayatollah Khomeini's- would
do little to bolster the Charter'slegitimacy, unless that vision could
be tied to some social consensus concerning the scope and identity of
those rights. This recognition has been reinforced by the strong positivist tradition in Anglo-Canadian law. Accordingly, the naturalist
impulse in Canadian jurisprudence has been accommodated and
subsumed within an indigenous and cultural account of entrenched
rights.
As a result of this theoretical merger, Canadian defenders of
Charter adjudication tend to differ more in emphasis than in kind.
For example, Brian Slattery gravitates towards the naturalist pole.
He contends that Charterrights are "anchored in a belief in the equal
worth of the individual human being, a worth that has a transcendent, and not merely a conventional status". Yet even Slattery feels
compelled to seek refuge in a positivist account of Charterinterpreta-
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tion, arguing that "constitutional adjudication involves contextual
decision-making within a particular tradition by reference to values
and principles that represent aspects of the tradition without exhausting it". John Whyte and David Beatty are more willing to consolidate their naturalist impulses within a positivist account of rights.
Whyte maintains that Charterrights embody the enduring principles
of liberal politics. According to Whyte, such rights are justified "on
the basis of the necessary conditions for representative democracy"
and "on the basis of the ideas of security and autonomy which are
the underlying justifications for representative democracy".' Beatty
adopts a variation on this theme. In elaborating a constitutional
labour code, he suggests that the liberal vision of rights he espouses
is found within and has informed Anglo-Canadian law over the past
century. Thus the Charterhas imposed an organic logic upon the
future means and ends of legislators who must now engage in a
"conversation of justification" with the courts.' Patrick Monahan
pursues a similar idea of "constitutional conversation", but his presentation is more overtly positivist. Espousing a form of democratic
communitarianism, Monahan contends that a legitimate mode of
judicial review must confine itself to nurturing and protecting active
participation in public decision-making; this is a goal that is integral
to the Canadian political tradition.' Whereas Slattery, Whyte and
Beatty want to hold the courts to the substantive dictates of an
individualist ethic, Monahan seeks to enlist courts in the procedural
ambition to maximize openness and revision in community relations.
All of these scholars intend their theories to check and legitimize
the potentially limitless and undemocratic authority of judicial
review. At the same time, each justifies the vision of Charter rights
he espouses by reference to values that are said to characterize Canada
as a community. At the root of these theories is the notion that
Charter rights reflect some form of social consensus, whether
grounded in conventional norms, community relations or an evolving
tradition.
4 B. Slattery, "Are Constitutional Cases Political?" (1989) i1 Supreme Court
L.R. (forthcoming).
5 J. Whyte, "Legality and Legitimacy: The Problem of Judicial Review of
Legislation" (1987) 12 Queen's L.J. i at 9.
0 D. Beatty, Putting The Charter To Work (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987) at 53.
7 P. Monahan, Politics and The Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and
The Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carsvell, 1987).
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III. THE CONFLICTING NATURE OF RIGHTS CLAIMS
The suggestion, sophisticately expressed and elegantly packaged,
that the rights expressed in the Charterreflect the abiding values and
shared aspirations of the Canadian community has an appealing ring
to it. Moreover, it is a view that appears, at first glance, to have much
to recommend it. Public opinion polls show that the vast majority of
Canadians favour the Charter. In addition, the rights contained in
the Charter,such as equality, liberty and freedom of association, are
ones to which most Canadians appear to subscribe.8 Yet first glances
can be deceiving. As attractive and plausible as the suggestion may
seem, it does not withstand close scrutiny. What it offers in style, it
lacks in substance. The very fact that there is strong disagreement
among Charter theorists over the source and nature of the community values to which they refer hints at the paper-thin cogency of
their jurisprudential strategy.
The fallacy upon which these theorists depend is that the existence
of broad public support for Charterrights is evidence that those rights
reflect a normative consensus. If anything, the opposite is true. Far
from representing a consensus, the rights in the Chartermask fundamental social and political conflicts. Rights-talk is more a medium of
dispute than an instrument of discovery. So long as these conflicts
remain buried, the appearance of consensus, and thus of legitimacy,
is maintained. However, as soon as they are exposed, that appearance
quickly evaporates. Once the Pandora's box of Charteradjudication
is thrown open, pressing its lid back down becomes impossible. The
objectivity of Charter interpretation ceases to be credible, and the
legitimacy of the Charteris once again called into question.
In the remainder of this essay, we outline the conflicts that arise in
rights adjudication and discuss the inability of orthodox theory to
account for or respond to these conflicts. While such conflicts are
numerous, they can be grouped into three categories: conflicts that
occur within rights; conflicts that occur between rights; and conflicts
that occur between rights and competing social interests. In tracing
these conflicts, our purpose is to build upon and extend a democratic
critique of liberal jurisprudence and legal practice in a post-Charter
8 See P. Sniderman, J. Fletcher, P. H. Russell and P. Tetlock, "Liberty,
Authority and Community: Civil Liberties and the Canadian Political Community" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political
Science Association, Windsor, Ontario 9 June 1988) [unpublished].
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Canada.' While a more thorough embracing of democratic politics
cannot resolve these conflicts, the abandonment of rights-talk may
at least clear the ground for more promising and progressive efforts
to achieve a genuine sense of community and common social purpose.
A.

CONFLICTS WITH

RIGHTS

Although the Charterlists clearly the rights to which people are
entitled, the content of those entitlements is anything but clear. The
rights in the Charterare characterized by their indeterminacy: they
mean different things to different people at different times. Indeed,
the malleable nature of Charterrights is one of the reasons that they
enjoy such a widespread public support. While such malleability
may prove an inconvenience in specific disputes, it helps to explain
the attraction of those rights in general terms.
Consider the rights we mentioned earlier: equality, liberty and
freedom of association. These rights are central to the Charter and
its political appeal. Yet they have no definite or uncontroversial meaning. They are contested concepts whose interpretation is a major and
elusive preoccupation of political debate. They are like empty sacks
that cannot stand up on their own until they have been filled with
political content. "Who fills them" and "with what" are the key
questions for Canadian politics. Nevertheless, Charter proponents
seem more concerned with finessing than facing these disturbing
issues.
The best example of rights indeterminacy is the popular principle
of equality. Although this principle receives almost universal approval, there is very little agreement on its scope and meaning. For
example, some commentators espouse a formal vision of equality,
one requiring that individuals be subject to equal treatment. Others
urge a substantive vision of equality, one demanding that individuals
be made equal in their condition. These alternative visions of equality
are not only distinct, but potentially contradictory. It is obvious, for
example, that governments cannot assist the poor to become equal in
condition to the rich by subjecting both groups to equal treatment.
Thus, while women's rights groups invoke substantive equality to
support special programs for women, men's rights groups invoke
formal equality to attack special programs for women.
8 Supreme Court L.R.
473; A. Hutchinson and A. Petter, "The Liberal Lie of the Charter: Private
Rights and Public Wrongs" (1988) 38 U. T. L.J. 278; A. Petter, "Legitimizing Sexual Inequality: Three Early Charter Cases" (1989) 34 McGill L.J. 358
and, A. Petter "Canada's Charter Flight: Soaring Backwards Into the Future"
(1989) 16 J. Law&Soc. 151.

0 See: A. Petter, "The Politics of the Charter" (1986)
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A good illustration of the conflict between formal and substantive
equality is provided by Re Tomen and Federation of Women
Teachers"Associations of Ontario." In that case, the Ontario Public
School Teachers' Federation (OPSTF), a predominantly male
organization, assisted Margaret Tomen to challenge an Ontario
Teachers' Federation regulation requiring women teachers in public
elementary schools to belong to the Federation of Women Teachers'
Associations of Ontario (FWTAO). The FWTAO had fought long
and hard on behalf of women teachers and, in doing so, had become
something of a thorn in the side of the male organization." Tomen
and the OPSTF maintained that the regulation contravened the
Charter's guarantee of equality in that it subjected teachers to unequal treatment on the basis of their sex. The FWTAO responded
that, far from denying sexual equality, the regulation sought to
advance equality. The membership requirement ensured that the
FWTAO would remain an effective instrument for promoting equal
conditions for women teachers. Both sides invoked equality: one to
attack the regulation, the other to defend it."
The Tomen case shows how formal and substantive visions of
equality can pull in opposite directions. But the problem does not
end there. Conflicts arise not only between these alternative visions,
but even within them. For instance, proponents of formal equality
maintain that the principle of equal treatment applies only to persons
who are "similarly situated". Those who are differently situated
should be dealt with differently. Yet the question of whether one
person is similarly situated with another is a highly controversial one.
Thus even formal equality theorists can reach contradictory conclusions depending upon their answer to this prior question.
An example of this form of conflict is provided by Andrews
v. Minister of Health for Ontario." The issue in that case was
whether the Ontario Hospital Insurance Plan (OHIP) contravened
the Charter'sguarantee of equality by providing medical coverage to
couples who were of the opposite sex, but not to those who were of
the same sex. Karen Andrews and her partner, Mary Trenholm,
10

z
12

(1987) 61 O.R. (2d) 489 (H.C.),43D.L.R. ( 4 th) 255.
See M. Lansberg, "The Charter: Herald of Fairness or Weapon against
Women?" The Globe and Mail (30 May 5987) 2.
Rather than confronting this conflict, the Court sidestepped the issue, holding
that the Charterdid not apply to the bylaw in question because the Ontario
Teacher's Federation, although regulated by statute, was a private rather
than a governmental body.

13 (1988) 49D.L.R. (4th) 584 (Ont. H.C.).
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argued that the right to equal treatment implied that lesbian couples
should be provided the same benefits as heterosexual couples. OHIP
disagreed, arguing that, because lesbian couples are not similarly
situated to heterosexual couples, the equality guarantee in the
Chartermandated that each be treated differently. This latter view
was the one adopted by the Court.
As the Tomen and Andrews cases demonstrate, the enduring
attraction of the right to equality does not lie in its content, but in its
lack of content. In both cases, the contending parties - Tomen and
the FWTAO, Andrews and OHIP - espoused a common belief in
the principle of equality. Yet the meaning that they attached to that
principle reflected fundamental differences in political outlook. The
message of these cases is clear. To become intelligible, the idea of
equality must draw upon external political values to determine which
visions and categories are to be employed. However, once these
external values are identified, equality itself becomes a superfluous
principle that amounts to nothing more than window-dressing. As
Marc Gold has succinctly noted: "... any given law can be both

defended and attacked in the name of equality.... To choose one
conception of equality over another is to choose between competing
political or moral theories."' 4
The right to liberty is similarly indeterminate. Those who subscribe to a negative vision of liberty conceive of it as a right not to be
interfered with by others. Those who subscribe to a positive vision
of liberty see it as the right to demand from others a greater share of
social resources. Again, these visions are not only distinct, but mutually contradictory. While property owners claim the liberty to exclude
people from their land, others claim the liberty to enter that land.
In R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery," for example, a trade union
invoked the Charter to challenge an injunction preventing it from
picketing the premises of a courier company. The union claimed that
the injunction violated the liberty of its members to engage in peaceful protest, thus affecting their freedom of expression. The company,
on the other hand, argued that the court should uphold the injunction
on the basis that the proposed picketing would interfere with its
liberty to conduct business, thus affecting its freedom to contract.
14 M. Gold, "Moral and Political Theories in Equalities Rights Adjudication"
in J. Weiler and R. Elliot, eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation: The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 85
at 88-9.
15 [r986] 2 S.C.R. 573, (x986) 33 D.L.R. (4th)

174.
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The validity of these competing assertions cannot be resolved by
reference to the right to liberty. Rather, their validity depends entirely
upon the background conditions that are seen to support and inform
the operation of that right. As with equality, competing liberty claims
can be resolved only by reference to extraneous values.
Freedom of association is another Charterright that is susceptible
to conflicting interpretations. Those who subscribe to an individualistic conception of freedom of association interpret that freedom as
conferring upon individuals the right to associate or disassociate as
they see fit. According to this conception, the associated individuals
have no more rights as a group than they do as individuals acting on
their own account. Those who subscribe to a collectivist conception
of freedom of association interpret that freedom as conferring upon
groups and organizations the right to act in concert to protect and
promote their associational activities. According to this conception,
the association's interests are seen as distinct from and greater than
those of its individual members. Again, these positions can be
invoked to support contradictory conclusions. For instance, while
trade unionists look to freedom of association to support the power
of unions to act on behalf of all employees at a workplace,"0 those
who oppose trade unions point to the same freedom to support the
right of individual employees to disassociate themselves from unionized activity.'" In the words of one commentator, freedom of association is a "double-edged constitutional sword".'
Rights are like tools. The purposes they serve depend upon the
hands that are placed upon them and the minds that direct those
hands. The veneer of consensus concerning the existence and desirability of rights masks deeper antagonisms concerning their meaning
and application. Such tensions represent profound disagreements
about the operative assumptions and informing visions of political
life and justice. At bottom, they are matters of "deep-seated preferences". 9 Thus the contention that Charter rights reflect shared
assumptions and values ceases to be credible euen at the point of
definition.
3. Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.) [r987] i S.C.R.
313, (1987) 38D.L.R. (4th) 161.
See Lavigne v. O.PS.E.U. (1989) 56 D.L.R. (4th) 474 (Ont. C.A.).
Is p. Gall, "Freedom of Association and Trade Unions: A Double-Edged Constitutional Sword" in J. Weiler and R. Elliot, eds., supra, note 14 at 245.
17

'9

0. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (New York: P. Smith, 192o) at 312.
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Just because rights are indeterminate in theory, however, does not
mean that they are indeterminate in practice. On the contrary, given
that their meaning is governed by those who have custody over them,
it is safe to assume that the interpretation placed upon Charterrights
will reflect and reinforce the established values of the legal system
and of legal elites. With respect to the rights we have discussed,
these values pull strongly in the direction of formal equality, negative liberty and an individualistic conception of associational rights?'
This is the Charter'shidden agenda. So long as it remains hidden,
people of all stations and political persuasions will see in the Charter
something to soothe them. It is only when groups like women, homosexuals and trade unionists experience that agenda first hand that
the illusion of social consensus engendered by the abstract rights
becomes threatened. Like all illusions, the determinacy of rights-talk
is suspended in the minds of citizens rather than grounded in the
imperatives of social conditions.
B.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN RIGHTS

Conflicts arise not solely within rights; there are also tensions
between rights. Here, as before, these tensions cannot be resolved by
some vague and hopeful appeal to social values or community consensus. The courts can serve only as a venue for the ceaseless efforts
to negotiate competing claims. The temporary accommodations
made are more a result of political expediency than moral purity.
For instance, the tension between the right to liberty and the right to
equality represents a fundamental conflict in ideological values, one
that has energized a whole tradition of political theory and debate.
Under the Charter,the courts are entrusted with the thankless task of
providing an answer to this conceptual conundrum. The Chartertext
offers no guidance as to how claims framed in the competing rhetoric
of "liberty" and "equality" are to be resolved. The judges are on a
sleeveless errand.
A prime example of this dilemma is provided by the pre-Charter
decision in Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun" In
this case, a gay rights group relied on the British Columbia Human
Rights Code to attack the Vancouver Sun's policy of denying gay
publications access to the classified advertising section of the newspaper. A Board of Inquiry found for the Alliance, holding that the
20

Supra,note 9.

21

E1979]

2 S.C.R. 435, [i979] 4 W.W.R. 118.
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Sun's policy denied gays equal access to a "service ... customarily

available to the public". When the case reached the courts, the Sun
argued that the Code should be interpreted as not applying to its classified services, since such application would encroach upon its common law right to freedom of the press. The judges were forced to
choose between competing rights: the equality of gays versus the
liberty of newspaper publishers. In the Supreme Court of Canada,
the majority plumbed for liberty, the minority for equality. To talk
of shared values or consensus in such circumstances is far-fetched;
there was no agreement even among the members of the Court, let
alone among the community at large.
The conflict between equality and liberty rights has also arisen in
Chartercases concerning pornography. For instance, in R. v. Red Hot
Video Ltd.,2 2 the British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected arguments that the obscenity provision of the CriminalCode contravened
the Charterright to freedom of expression. According to the Court,
the provision was justified because the form of expression it prohibited
was demeaning to women and therefore undermined sexual equality
rights. In this case, unlike Gay Alliance, the judges opted for equality
over liberty. 3
Both Gay Alliance and Red Hot Video required the courts to
confront a basic tension between competing individual rights. Another tension that has driven debate in political theory is the conflict
between the rights of individuals and those of groups. We have
already seen how this conflict can be played out in the context of a
single right, such as freedom of association; however, it also arises
in the interaction between competing rights.
The recent controversy concerning Quebec's language laws testifies
to the enduring and pervasive irreconcilability of this conflict. In
A.G. Quebec v. La Chaussure Brown's Inc., store owners challenged the constitutional authority of the Quebec legislature to
require that commercial signs in the province be posted in French
22
23

(1985) x8 0.C.C. ( 3d) x,4 5 0.R. (3d) 36.
The same tension underlies Charter cases
example, in R. v. Keegstra (988)

concerning hate propaganda. For

43 0.0.0. (3d)

250,

the Alberta Court

of Appeal struck down the Criminal Code provision making it an offence to

wilfully promote hatred against an identifiable group. According to the Court,
the provision violated the Charter'sright to freedom of expression. However,
in R. v. Andrews (1988) 43 0.0.0. ( 3 d) 193, the Ontario Court of Appeal
ruled that the Charterprovided no protection for hate propaganda. According
to the majority, such propaganda "is entirely antithetical to our very notion
of freedom".
24

(1989)

54

D.L.R. 5 77 (S.C.C.).

1989

RIGHTS IN CONFLICT

only. The province defended its law as a measure necessary to protect
the linguistic and cultural rights of a francophone collectivity isolated
within a predominantly English-speaking North America. The store
owners, on the other hand, resorted to the familiar rhetoric of individual freedom. They contended that the cultural rights of the collectivity were secondary to the speech rights of individuals in the
province. The response of the Supreme Court of Canada was to try
to effect a compromise between these competing positions. The
Court struck down the law as it stood, but held that the legislature
could enact a new provision requiring that French be the predominant, though not exclusive, language on commercial signs.
Ironically, even this transparent attempt at political accommodation
was unsuccessful as an exercise in consensus building. Not only did
the Court's compromise fail to satisfy the francophone majority in
Quebec, it outraged at least one of the store owners who had initiated
the court action.
Conflicts occur not only between individual rights and between
individual and group rights; they also arise between the rights
of competing groups. This form of conflict arose in the Ontario
Reference re Bill 3 o , An Act to Amend the EducationAct (Ont.)
When the Ontario government extended full public funding to
Roman Catholic high schools, it defended its action on the basis that
such funding was required by the rights afforded to denominational
schools under the original Confederation compact. Other religious
groups, however, took a different view. They contended that the
Charterright to equality prohibited the government from extending
funding to one religious organization without providing comparable
funding to all religious organizations. It was left to the Supreme
Court of Canada to choose between these competing group claims.
The Court came down on the side of denominational school rights,
although the reasons it offered for doing so were more conclusory
than explanatory. Certainly, it would take an inspired or desperate
imagination to argue that its choice was based upon a consensus of
values that the judges were able to detect within the larger Canadian
community.
In each of these disputes, the court was presented with an unenviable task. In order to meet the challenge, judges have increasingly
fallen back on the interpretive practice of "balancing". The major
thrust of this rudimentary methodology is to identify different interests, attributed respective values to each, and then weigh them on
.

25

[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148.
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a constitutional scale. However, rather than comprising a solution
to the dilemma of constitutional legitimacy, balancing seems to
concede the fundamental incommensurability of constitutional argument. It seeks to make the political best of a bad legal job. For all its
open-endedness, balancing is little more than a convenient device
enabling the judiciary to place its political thumb upon the illusory
constitutional scales of social justice.
C.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN RIGHTS AND

COMPETING SOCIAL INTERESTS

In addition to there being competition within and between rights,
there is a third category of conflict: conflicts between rights and
competing social interests that are not identified as rights. This form
of conflict arises in the vast majority of Charter cases. It is most
explicitly addressed in applying the "reasonable limits" proviso in
s. I, but it also forms an implicit component of the process of ascertaining the scope of the rights themselves.
It might be tempting to think that, whenever there is a conflict
between a right and some other interest, the competing interest
should give way. But even the strongest rights advocates recognize
that there are cases in which rights must yield to competing social
considerations. 6 While rights are considered to be fundamental,
they are not portrayed as being absolute. For instance, no one would
argue that the right to equality entitles a six year old to obtain a
driver's licence. The question, therefore, is not whether Charter
rights should yield to competing social interests, but when should
they yield. Wherever the answer to this puzzle may lie, it certainly
will not be found in a prevailing social consensus or evolving social
tradition. In all but the most mundane instances of children who wish
to drive, such disputes speak to the fractures in community values,
not to their availability as a source of normative resolution.
Three examples will suffice to make the point. The first concerns
provincial Sunday closing legislation. Such legislation was challenged
in Edwards Books and Art Ltd. v. The Queen2 7 on the basis that it
violated the religious freedom of certain Jewish and Seventh Day
Adventist store owners. These proprietors were forced to close on
Sunday in addition to their regular Saturday sabbath. This placed
28
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them at an economic disadvantage in relation to Christian store
owners, who were obliged to close on only one day of the week. The
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the legislation
denied religious rights, yet they upheld the law. In their view, the
violation of religious rights was reasonable in light of the conflicting
value of preserving a common day of rest.
The second example concerns the decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Morgentalerv. The Queen. 8 In that case, the Court
was called upon to decide whether the Criminal Code prohibition
on abortion violated the right of women to security of the person
within the meaning of s. 7 of the Charter.The majority held that it
did. However, that was not the end of the matter. Before striking the
provision down, the judges were forced to consider, and to reject,
submissions that the conflicting value of preserving the lives of
fetuses justified the encroachment on women's rights. This they did,
although the majority judgments differed in their explanations for
rejecting that justification.
The third example concerns s. 195.i ( I ) (c) of the Criminal Code

which makes it an offence to communicate in a public place for the
purposes of prostitution. Two provincial courts of appeal have
decided that this provision violates the Charterguarantee of freedom
of expression. In both courts, however, governments argued that the
violation was reasonable in order to guard against the public nuisance
created by street prostitution. In R. v. Jahelka,"9 the Alberta Court
of Appeal accepted this argument; in R. v. Skinner,"0 the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal did not.
All of these decisions forced the courts to make difficult trade-offs
between Charterrights and competing social interests. In Edwards
Books the competing interest won out; in Morgentaler the right
prevailed; and Jahelka and Skinner produced a split decision. However the key question is not "who won", but "on what basis did they
win". Is it credible to suggest that the choices made were simply a reflection of deep-rooted community norms? Surely it is not, for it is
hard to think of three issues on which there is deeper normative division in Canada than Sunday closing, abortion and prostitution. Even
the judges in these cases could not agree. Here, as before, the appeal to
community consensus provides a convenient blind that hides the
28 [1988] 1 S.0.R. 30, (1988)
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informing values and visions of social justice that drive and determine
the controversial choices that have to be made.
IV. THE FAILURE OF CONSENSUS THEORY
Charteradjudication is not about the dispassionate application of
constitutional rules to given sets of social facts. Instead, the courts'
unavoidable task is to confront and resolve fundamental social and
political conflicts, whether they are conflicts within rights, between
rights, or between rights and competing social interests. Once this is
understood, the justification for the Charter and, in particular, the
courts' role in interpreting and enforcing Charterrights on the basis
of community values or on the basis of evolving social tradition
becomes profoundly unconvincing. Issues like affirmative action,
union rights, language policy and abortion lie at the heart of political
controversy in Canada. Whatever the explanation for handing
decision-making power over these crucial issues to the courts, it
cannot be that of social consensus. If there is a consensus at work in
these decisions, it is a consensus only among the community of
legal elites." '
The irony, of course, is that if there were a true consensus of community values on issues such as these, there would be no need for a
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Under the Charter, community
consensus runs out at the very time that it is most needed, that is,
when disputes arise because of a breakdown, gap or shortfall in the
extant body of conventional norms. It is not that there is no sense of
shared values in Canada, but that there is always one too many sets of
such values. Canada is a mosaic of different communities, including
natives, Quebecois, women, Westerns, W.A.S.P.s, workers, ethnics,
Catholics, Acadians, gays and so on. For instance, in the abortion
debate, it is not that there is no sense of social solidarity, but that
there are two very strong and largely irreconcilable communities that
draw upon and are energized by different visions of individual
responsibility and social justice.
One of the unanswerable questions for those who seek to justify
the Charter on the basis of community consensus is why the community cannot be trusted with its own consensus. If the Charteris
truly about protecting community values, why can those values not
be identified and given voice through democratic means? Recognizing that any consensus is organic and protean, it is difficult to under31
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stand why it should be entrenched in a document that is practically
impossible to change and enforced by a group of citizens that are
unrepresentative of and unaccountable to the community at large. If
there is a detailed and uncontroversial body of extant norms, there
will be no need for judicial review. But, if there is no such consensus
and surely there is not - the defence of judicial review in terms
of such a consensus is futile.
It seems that, inspired rather than disabused by the tribulations of
of their American counterparts, Canadian jurists are intent on banging their heads against the proverbial brick wall of constitutional
legitimacy. How is it, or how could it ever be, possible to appeal to
an idea of community, consensus or tradition to resolve a division of
opinion, when that division arises from the inadequacy, indeterminacy or contentiousness of the very idea that it is being invoked?
The only benefit of such an exercise is that it might belatedly knock
some political sense into those who go through its motions. Unfortunately, the effect to date seems to have been to encourage even
more outrageous hallucinatory reveries of theoretical excess.
The point we are making is certainly not new, nor is it particularly
radical. Indeed, it is little more than an elaboration on an observation
made over a dozen years ago in a case that involved much the same
conflict between picketing and property rights that arose in Dolphin
Delivery: 2
The submission that this court should weigh and determine the
respective values to society of the right to property and the right to
picket raises important and difficult political and socio-economic
issues, the resolution of which must, by their very nature, be arbitrary
and embody personal economic and social beliefs. It also raises fundamental questions as to the role of this Court under the Constitution.
...
I do not for a moment doubt the power of the Court to act
creatively-it has done so on countless occasions; but manifestly
one must ask - what are the limits of the judicial function.2"
Who was this outspoken skeptic of judicial review? Remarkably, it
was none other than the Right Honourable Brian Dickson, now
Chief Justice of Canada. Has the enactment of the Charter transformed the "arbitrary" and "personal" opinions of Chief Justice
Dickson and his colleagues into "principled" and "objective" pronouncements based upon community values or an evolving tradition?
Lord Acton would not be satisfied by that explanation. Nor should we.
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V. CONCLUSION
Many seem disheartened by the thought that there may be no
principled or non-ideological answers to contentious social issues.-"
Yet there is no warrant for cynicism or despair. Acknowledging
people as the makers of decisions, rather than the recipients of
received wisdom, marks the first step in the long march toward
broadening social responsibility and dispersing political power in
Canada. Democracy is not about servitude to academic scribblers or
imperial judges; it is about personal participation and social solidarity. Power can never be abolished; it can only be entrusted to
those who lives it most directly affects and affirms.
In a world of incorrigible indeterminacy, the sane response is not
to collapse in frustration. It is to move forward confidently in the
knowledge that decision-making is no more mysterious and no less
complex than the rest of life. The present failings of democracy can
be overcome not by less popular participation, but by more. People
must think, decide and act in the same way in law as they aspire to
do in the rest of their lives, that is, through concrete and constitutive
action. This recognition and aspiration means that political practice
must be given priority over constitutional conversation. The devaluation of the rule of law, in a society in which it has come to signify rule
by lawyers, is not an occasion to be lamented. Democracy is about
ourselves; not some of us, but all of us.
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